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THE SENSES 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers and scientists have studied sensory perception and, in particular, vision for many 
years. Increasingly, however, they have become interested in the nonvisual senses in greater 
detail and the problem of *individuating the senses* in a more general way. The Aristotelian 
view is that there are only five external senses—smell (see *Sensory Modalities: Olfaction*), 
taste (see *Sensory Modalities: Taste and Flavor*), hearing (see *Sensory Modalities: 
Audition*), touch (see *Sensory Modalities: Touch*), and vision (see *Sensory Modalities: 
Vision*). This has, by many counts, been extended to include internal senses, such as balance, 
proprioception, and kinesthesis (see *Sensory Modalities: Bodily Awareness*); pain (see 
*Sensory Modalities: Pain*); and potentially other human (see *Sensory Modalities: Other
Human Senses*) and nonhuman senses (see *Sensory Modalities: Nonhuman Senses)*. This
“multisensory turn” has been driven partly by developments in contemporary psychology and
neuroscience (see *Anthologies: Psychology and Neuroscience*), which have revealed a host of
complex interrelations and interactions between sensory modalities previously thought to be
distinct. Contrasts between modalities (see *Contrasting the Senses*) and other crossmodal
phenomena, including multisensory integration (see *Crossmodal Phenomena*), synesthesia (see
*Crossmodal Phenomena: Synesthesia*, and sensory substitution (see *Sensory Enhancement
and Deficits: Sensory Substitution*), have also begun to receive more attention in a burgeoning
scientific and philosophical literature on multisensory perception (see *Crossmodal Phenomena:
Multisensory Perception*) and other crossmodal effects (see *Crossmodal Phenomena: Other
Crossmodal Phenomena)*. This article focuses on recent empirically informed contributions to
the philosophy of perception, as well as key scientific works that provide important background
information and insights into the nature of the senses and sensory perception. Indeed, one of the
lessons of the multisensory turn, and of contemporary philosophy of mind more generally, is that
philosophers ignore this body of empirical research at their peril because many human and
animal senses turn out to be richer and more complex than philosophers and scientists had
previously imagined, making this a fruitful area for interdisciplinary interaction and research.
(The authors would like to thank David Bain, Clare Batty, Jennifer Corns, Robert Cowan,
Ophelia Deroy, Alistair Isaac, Barry Smith, Charles Spence, Dustin Stokes, and an anonymous
reviewer for Oxford Bibliographies for their comments and suggestions. This work was 
supported by a grant from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, grant number 
AH/L007053/1.) 
ANTHOLOGIES AND REFERENCE 
In keeping with the multidisciplinary nature of the study of the senses, key reference works in 
philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, and history and anthropology have been included that 
may be of interest to philosophers working in this area. Anthologies and books that relate 
primarily to individual sensory modalities, crossmodal phenomena, and animal perception are 
referenced under the relevant sections. 
Philosophy 
Although as of the mid-2010s, no general textbooks are available on the philosophy of the 
senses, as opposed to perception and philosophy of mind more generally; however, the 
anthologies and collections cited in this section provide a representative overview of the 
literature. These include contributions from many philosophers who have actively engaged with 
the empirical literature (see *Psychology and Neuroscience*), as well as many of the works cited 
elsewhere in this article. A good starting point is Macpherson ed. 2011, which contains a 
selection of influential historical and contemporary papers that focus, although not exclusively, 
on the individuation of the senses (see *Individuating the Senses*). Stokes, et al. 2015 and 
Bennett and Hill 2014 provide recent additions to the literature, particularly in the areas of 
multisensory perception, attention and awareness, and comparisons of different sensory 
modalities (see *Contrasting the Senses*). Matthen 2015 offers comprehensive overviews of a 
wide range of topics on the philosophy of perception and the senses, each written by subject 
experts and containing detailed bibliographical references, making it an excellent resource for 
further research. 
Bennett, David J., and Christopher Hill, eds. Sensory Integration and the Unity of 
Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014. [ISBN: 9780262027786] 
A wide-ranging collection of recent essays with a particular focus on multisensory perception 
and the way in which relationships between various senses (see *Contrasting the Senses*) 
gives rise to unified conscious experiences. 
Macpherson, Fiona, ed. The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [ISBN: 9780195385960] 
This philosophical collection is the first to address the individuation of the senses directly (see 
*Individuating the Senses*) and includes key historical and new works. A good starting point
for further reading and research.
Matthen, Mohan, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199600472] 
A comprehensive guide to contemporary philosophy of perception. Each chapter provides a 
critical overview of the relevant subtopic written by subject experts, plus extensive 
bibliographical references. Contains sections specifically on the senses, integrating sensory 
information, and theoretical frameworks for perception. 
Schwartz, Robert, ed. Perception. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004. [ISBN: 9780631224211] 
Contains chapters from key historical and contemporary writers on the senses in both 
philosophy and psychology, including Aristotle, Berkeley, Reid, Helmholtz, Koffka, Gibson, 
 Evans, O’Shaughnessy, and Churchland, as well as more general work on theories of 
perception. 
Stokes, Dustin, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, eds. Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
An excellent collection of more recent work covering a range of issues relating to the senses, 
multisensory perception, and crossmodal phenomena. 
Psychology and Neuroscience 
There is a vast and rapidly expanding scientific literature on sensory perception, the 
interpretation of which can be difficult and demanding for philosophers not versed in the relevant 
experimental methods. Most introductory psychology textbooks, however, offer a section on 
perception and the senses, and numerous dedicated introductions to the science of perception are 
readily available. These introductory textbooks are highly recommended for general background 
on the physiology, psychology, and neuroscience of the senses—the details of which are often 
underexplored (and sometimes misunderstood) in philosophical debates (see Twedt and Proffitt 
2015 for further recommendation). For more advanced references, see Calvert, et al. 2004 and 
Stein 2012, which are very technical in places and thus may be difficult for the nonspecialist. 
Generally speaking, the influence of Gibson 1966 and Marr 1982 (the latter cited under *Sensory 
Modalities: Vision*) cannot be understated, with many psychologists following a variant of 
either ecological or computational approaches. Other volumes focus on space and attention 
across the senses (Spence and Driver 2004), developmental issues (Bremner, et al. 2012), and 
nonhuman senses (Hughes 1999). 
Bremner, Andrew J., David J. Lewkowicz, and Charles Spence, eds. Multisensory Development. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [ISBN: 9780199586059] 
Examines the development of the senses from early gestation to old age, with a focus on 
multisensory processing and integration. 
Calvert, Gemma A., Charles Spence, and Barry E. Stein, eds. The Handbook of Multisensory 
Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. [ISBN: 9780262033213] 
An influential collection of psychological and neuroscientific studies of perception, with 
dedicated sections on speech, multisensory integration, orientation, plasticity, and clinical 
studies. An excellent reference resource, although highly technical in places. 
Gibson, James J. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1966. 
Elucidates Gibson’s “ecological” theory of perception, an influential forerunner of modern 
embodied and enactive approaches that may be contrasted with the computational approach to 
sensory processing described by Marr 1982 (cited under *Sensory Modalities: Vision*). For 
further information, see the Oxford Bibliographies article “*Ecological 
Psychology[obo-9780199828340-0072]*.” 
Hughes, Howard C. Sensory Exotica: A World beyond Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999. [ISBN: 9780262582049] 
An accessible and fascinating collection that recounts the discovery of, and anatomical and 
physiological principles behind, a broad range of nonhuman senses, including echolocation in 
bats and dolphins, biological compasses, and electroperception. 
Spence, Charles, and Jon Driver, eds. Crossmodal Space and Crossmodal Attention. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. [ISBN: 9780198524878] 
 A collection of essays by leading scientific experts on the multimodal representation of space 
and the way in which this constrains spatial attention. (See also Eilan, et al. 1993, cited under 
*Crossmodal Phenomena: Other Crossmodal Phenomena*.) 
Stein, Barry E., ed. The New Handbook of Multisensory Processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2012. [ISBN: 9780262017121] 
A comprehensive cross-section of more recent research in this area organized thematically, 
with each chapter written by a domain expert, and with a detailed bibliography. As with 
Calvert, et al. 2004, this book is highly technical in places, but section-level introductions are 
helpful for putting the research in context. 
Twedt, Elyssa, and Dennis R. Proffitt. “Perception[obo-9780199828340-0119].” In Oxford 
Bibliographies in Psychology. Edited by Dana S. Dunn. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2015. 
Annotated bibliography covering the neural processing of sensory information via the five 
Aristotelian senses. Examines the organization of sensory systems in the brain, and how these 
map onto perceptual experience. An excellent starting point for further reading and research. 
History and Anthropology 
In addition to the scientific literature (see *Psychology and Neuroscience*), there is a rich 
tradition of historical and anthropological work on the way in which the senses have been 
viewed over time by different cultures. Notable works include Howes 1991 and Classen 1993. 
See also Howes and Classen 2013, as well as Classen 2014, the extensive and beautifully 
illustrated book that illustrates the importance of the senses and sensory experience to human life 
and culture. Papers, book reviews, and other useful resources in the interdisciplinary field of 
sensory studies are available on the **Sensory Studies: Books of Note** website, edited by 
David Howes. 
Ackerman, Diane. A Natural History of the Senses. New York: Random House, 1991. [ISBN: 
9780394573359] 
A popular and engagingly written introduction to the richness and variety of the five 
Aristotelian senses across different cultures and historical periods. 
Classen, Constance. Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures. 
London: Routledge, 1993. [ISBN: 9780415101264] 
Historical study examining how cross-cultural variability in the hierarchy and ordering of the 
senses affects our worldview. 
Classen, Constance, ed. A Cultural History of the Senses. 6 vols. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. 
[ISBN: 9780857853387] 
An extensive reference work written by leading historians that gives a detailed cultural history 
of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Empire, and the Modern Age, 
drawing on all of the senses. 
Howes, David, ed. The Varieties of Sensory Experience: A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of 
the Senses. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991. [ISBN: 9780802068446] 
One of the first works to consider the range of sensory experience both across and within 
cultures, including many interesting case studies. (See also Classen 1993.) 
Howes, David, and C. Classen. Ways of Sensing: Understanding the Senses in Society. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2013. [ISBN: 9780415697149] 
Explores the cultural, historical, and political dimensions of sensory experience across cultures 
and historical periods. A good starting point for further reading. 
 Jütte, Robert. A History of the Senses: From Antiquity to Cyberspace. Translated by James Lynn. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005. [ISBN: 9780745629582] 
Charts the history of our sensory concepts, and the ways in which the senses have been 
regarded from Antiquity into the early 21st century. 
*Sensory Studies: Books of Note[http://www.sensorystudies.org/books-of-note/].* Edited by 
David Howes. [class:data-database] 
Regularly updated bibliography of publications in the multidisciplinary field of sensory studies. 
The website also contains a directory of researchers and other useful resources including the 
*Senses and Society[http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rfss20/current]* journal. 
INDIVIDUATING THE SENSES 
The question of how many sensory modalities humans have and how they should be individuated 
has been discussed extensively in the philosophical literature. The introduction to Macpherson 
ed. 2011 (pp. 3–43) provides an overview of that debate, which dates back to Aristotle who is 
credited with the now-commonplace idea that humans have only five senses. Although most 
people in the early 21st century are now fairly familiar with scientific work that identifies as 
many as seventeen or even thirty-three potential candidates for human senses, as the evidence 
presented by Dallenbach 1939 demonstrates, the number of senses that humans have has been 
hotly disputed through the centuries. Thus it is a myth that academics have been settled on 
humans having only five senses. Macpherson’s “fine-grained” view is further developed in 
Macpherson ed. 2015 and may be contrasted with the sensory pluralism of Fulkerson 2014, 
conventionalism of Richardson 2014, and the “two-concept” view of Matthen 2015 (cf. Gibson 
1966 [cited under *Anthologies and Reference: Psychology and Neuroscience*] who 
distinguishes between “sensory” and “perceptual” modalities). For further discussion of the 
interaction between the philosophical individuation question and the physical sciences, see 
Casati, et al. 2015. 
Casati, Roberto, Jérôme Dokic, and François Le Corre. “Distinguishing the Commonsense 
Senses.” In Perception and Its Modalities. Edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and 
Stephen Biggs, 462–479. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
Examines the four criteria—qualia, content, stimulus, and sensory organ—that are traditionally 
used to differentiate the senses, employing a series of thought experiments designed to 
establish the contribution of “qualia,” or phenomenal character, to the individuation of the 
senses. 
Dallenbach, Karl M. “Pain: History and Present Status.” American Journal of Psychology 52 
(1939): 331–347. 
Although focusing on pain, Dallenbach presents a historical overview of philosophical 
considerations about which senses humans have, characterizing the history of pain as a three-
way battle between whether (1) it is a distinct sensory modality, (2) it arises from the intensive 
stimulation of other modalities, or (3) it is a felt quality or affective state. 
Fulkerson, Matthew. “Rethinking the Senses and Their Interactions: The Case for Sensory 
Pluralism.” Frontiers in Psychology 5 (2014): 1–14. 
Defends a form of pragmatism, or “pluralism,” about the distinction between the senses 
according to which there is no single privileged way of individuating sensory modalities, which 
do not form a unified natural kind. Instead, Fulkerson takes the relevant individuation criteria 
to be relative to explanatory goals. 
 Macpherson, Fiona. “The Space of Sensory Modalities.” In Perception and Its Modalities. Edited 
by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, 432–461. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
Develops ideas presented in the introduction to Macpherson ed. 2011 (pp. 3–43) to provide a 
fine-grained account of sensory individuation in terms of a multi-dimensional “space” of sense 
modality-types. 
Macpherson, Fiona, ed. The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. [ISBN: 9780195385960] 
A wide-ranging collection that includes classic works by Aristotle, H. P. Grice, John Heil, 
Brian L. Keeley, J. W. Roxbee Cox, among others, in addition to new contributions from 
Richard Gray, A. D. Smith, Matthew Nudds, and others. The introduction provides a helpful 
overview of the philosophical issues surrounding the individuation of the senses and offers a 
good starting point for further reading. 
Matthen, Mohan. “The Individuation of the Senses.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Perception. Edited by Mohan Matthen, 567–586. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
[ISBN: 9780199600472] 
Defends a distinction between the scientific and folk conceptions of what constitutes a sensory 
modality, both of which Matthen argues are based on the central notion of “information 
pickup” (cf. Gibson 1966, cited under *Anthologies and Reference: Psychology and 
Neuroscience*). 
Richardson, Louise. “Non Sense-Specific Perception and the Distinction between the Senses.” 
Res Philosophica 91 (2014): 215–239. 
Examines how the prevalence of multisensory perception bears on the individuation of sensory 
modalities, arguing that this leaves room for the notions of the “senses as systems” and “senses 
as capacities” (cf. Nudds in Macpherson ed. 2011, pp. 311–340). 
SENSORY MODALITIES 
Given the lack of consensus over how to individuate the senses (see *Individuating the Senses*), 
any attempt at a taxonomy will be contentious, and this section is no exception. Included here are 
the five exteroceptive “Aristotelian” senses: smell or *Olfaction*, *Taste and Flavor*, 
*Audition*, *Touch*, and *Vision*, with separate sections for various forms of interoception 
(see *Bodily Awareness*) include position, movement, and internal condition of our bodies; 
awareness of body position (proprioception); awareness of self-movement (kinesthesis); and 
balance and acceleration (the vestibular system). *Pain* is sometimes also regarded as a sensory 
modality. More controversial cases, including the sense of agency, temporal passage, and 
pheromone detection, are grouped under *Other Human Senses*, with a final section on 
*Nonhuman Senses*. Each section highlights works that deal with the particular characteristics 
of, and issues relevant to, the specific sense in question. A notable exception is *Vision*, the 
literature on which is too extensive to give a representative sample. This is partly because 
philosophers have—somewhat misleadingly in the view of the authors of this article—taken 
vision to be characteristic of all of the senses. This section therefore focuses instead on the 
variety and dominance of visual experience. For comparisons between sensory modalities, see 
*Contrasting the Senses*. 
 Olfaction 
The distinctiveness of olfaction, along with how it differs from vision, are introduced by Lycan 
2000, with Batty 2010 providing an excellent survey of the philosophical issues concerning the 
nature of odors and olfactory experience (see also the Oxford Bibliographies article by Batty 
“*Olfaction[obo-9780195396577-0333]*”). Smith 2015 discusses the senses of smell, taste, and 
the often-neglected trigeminal system—collectively referred to as the “chemical senses”—along 
with the interactions among these and other senses that underpin flavor perception (see *Taste 
and Flavor*), of which retronasal olfaction is a major component. Smith also considers whether 
orthonasal and retronasal olfaction should be regarded as the same or distinct modalities—an 
issue brought to prominence in the psychological literature by Rozin 1982. Richardson 2013 
argues that, like vision, orthonasal olfaction (“sniffing”) is exteroceptive rather than 
interoceptive, whereas Mizrahi 2013 defends a view of odors according to which they are 
properties of “stuffs.” Young, et al. 2014 argues that, despite the relative complexity and number 
of dimensions of olfactory discrimination, it is possible to apply quality-space theory to the sense 
of smell. For loss of olfaction, see Tafalla 2013, cited under *Sensory Enhancement and Deficits: 
Sensory Loss*. 
Batty, Clare. “Olfactory Experience.” Philosophy Compass 5 (2010): 1137–1156. 
A two-part review article that provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophical issues 
relating to olfaction and the challenges that this presents for representational views of olfactory 
experience, including Batty’s view. The first, “The Content of Olfactory Experience” (pp. 
1137–1146), deals with the content of olfactory experiences, and the second, “Objects and 
Properties” (pp. 1147–1156), focuses on the nature of olfactory objects and olfactory 
properties. 
Lycan, William G. “The Slighting of Smell.” In Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical 
Perspectives on Chemistry. Edited by Nalini Bhushan and Stuart Rosenfeld, 273–289. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Argues that olfaction differs significantly from vision in various key respects and that the 
history of philosophy of perception would have taken a very different path had theorists 
focused on the former instead of the latter. 
Mizrahi, Vivian. “Sniff, Smell, and Stuff.” Philosophical Studies 171 (2013): 233–250. 
Debunks the idea that smell is informationally poor or otherwise impoverished compared to the 
other senses (cf. Lycan 2000 and Batty 2010), and defends a view of odors according to which 
smells are not particular objects, but properties of “stuffs,” i.e., substances that are most 
naturally referred to using mass nouns, as opposed to count nouns. 
Richardson, Louise. “Sniffing and Smelling.” Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 401–419. 
Argues that orthonasal olfaction (“sniffing”) is exteroceptive, i.e., seems to be of objects that 
are external to the body, and that the act of inhaling odors into the body makes a distinctive 
contribution to the phenomenal character of olfactory experience. 
Rozin, Paul. “‘Taste–Smell’ Confusions and the Duality of the Olfactory Sense.” Perception & 
Psychophysics 31 (1982): 397–401. 
This influential psychology article claims that olfaction is a “dual modality” due to its role in 
both smell and “taste,” i.e., flavor perception (cf. Gibson 1966, cited under *Anthologies and 
Reference: Psychology and Neuroscience*). Predicts qualitative differences between the 
phenomenal character and representational content of orthonasal and retronasal olfaction, 
although whether these are borne out by the empirical evidence is controversial (see Smith 
2015 for a discussion of this). 
 Smith, Barry C. “The Chemical Senses.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. 
Edited by Mohan Matthen, 314–352. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 
9780199600472] 
Excellent empirically informed overview of the philosophical issues relating to, and distinction 
between, smell; taste and flavor perception, including the distinction between orthonasal and 
retronasal olfaction; and contributions made by the nose, tongue, and somatosensory and 
trigeminal systems to the multimodal experience of flavor.  
Watson, Lyall. Jacobson’s Organ and the Remarkable Nature of Smell. London: Penguin, 1999. 
[ISBN: 9780713993479] 
Examines the role of smell and pheromone perception in humans, plants, and animals, in 
particular, whether the eponymous “Jacobson’s Organ,” or vomeronasal organ (VNO), is 
functional in humans (see *Other Human Senses*). Also examines the role of smell in memory 
formation and social interaction. 
Young, Benjamin D., Andreas Keller, and David Rosenthal. “*Quality-Space Theory in 
Olfaction[https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00001/full]*.” Frontiers in 
Psychology 5 (2014). 
Applies quality-space theory, a theory of qualitative character, to olfaction, describing the 
challenges to the construction of an olfactory “quality space”—generally thought to have a 
large number of dimensions—and how these might be met. 
Taste and Flavor 
Smith 2013 provides a concise overview of the philosophical issues, including the distinction 
between the “taste” perception in the strict scientific sense, which originates at the tongue, and 
“flavor,” which Spence, et al. 2015 believes to be a multisensory experience involving sensory 
inputs from multiple modalities—taste, smell, trigeminal, touch, audition, and even vision. The 
precise taxonomy of the human taste, smell, and flavor senses is, however, disputed, with 
theorists differing over whether “taste” should be taken to involve an olfactory component 
(Richardson 2013, Smith 2013, and Smith 2015), or whether flavor should itself be considered a 
distinctive modality (Auvray and Spence 2008). A detailed discussion of the biological and 
psychological basis of flavor perception may be found in Stevenson 2009, with the implications 
of the multimodality of flavor perception for dining and gastronomy discussed by Spence and 
Piqueras-Fiszman 2014. For general background on the importance of food and flavor to human 
experience, see Korsmeyer 2005. 
Auvray, Malika, and Charles Spence. “The Multisensory Perception of Flavor.” Consciousness 
and Cognition 17 (2008): 1016–1031. 
Accessible review article that presents scientific evidence for a variety of interactions between 
the various chemical senses. This builds on work by Gibson 1966 (cited under *Anthologies 
and Reference: Psychology and Neuroscience*) to posit a multimodal “flavor” modality which 
draws on a variety of perceptual inputs. (See also Spence, et al. 2015 and Richardson 2013.) 
Korsmeyer, Carolyn, ed. The Taste Culture Reader: Experiencing Food and Drink. Oxford: 
Berg, 2005. [ISBN: 9781845200619] 
A wide-ranging collection that examines the importance of food and flavor to human 
experience and society, with contributions from anthropology, sociology, history, philosophy, 
and science. Good background reading. 
Richardson, Louise. “Flavour, Taste and Smell.” Mind and Language 28 (2013): 322–341. 
 Argues that “non-naturalism”—the view that human senses, and taste and smell in particular, 
are individuated according to an everyday conception of these in a way that does not carry any 
empirical commitments that are correctable by the sciences—remains a viable option. See also 
Nudds in Macpherson 2011 (pp. 311–340, cited under *Individuating the Senses*) and the 
“Symposium on Louise Richardson’s ‘Flavour, Taste and Smell’” on the website *The Brains 
Blog[http://philosophyofbrains.com/2013/06/06/louise-richardson-synpo.aspx]*. 
Smith, Barry C. “Taste, Philosophical Perspectives.” In Encyclopedia of the Mind. Vol. 2. Edited 
by Harold Pashler, 731–735. San Diego, CA: SAGE, 2013. [ISBN: 9781452257044] 
Encyclopedia entry that provides an overview of key issues in the philosophy of taste and 
flavor, including whether tastes are sensations, properties, or substances; the temporal 
dimension of tasting; and the nature of flavors and flavor perception. A good starting point for 
further reading. (See also Smith 2015.) 
Smith, Barry C. “The Chemical Senses.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. 
Edited by Mohan Matthen, 314–352. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 
9780199600472] 
Empirically informed overview of the philosophical issues surrounding the chemical senses of 
taste, smell, and flavor. Sections that relate specifically to taste and flavor include the nature of 
flavors and flavor experiences, the contribution of the tongue to tasting flavors, and a 
discussion on whether tastes are sensations. (See also Smith 2013 and Spence, et al. 2015.) 
Spence, Charles, Malika Auvray, and Barry Smith. “Confusing Tastes with Flavours.” In 
Perception and Its Modalities. Edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, 
247–274. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
Further develops the philosophical implications of ideas presented by Auvrey and Spence 
2008, including details of the “referral” of olfactory stimuli to the mouth, and the role of 
attention, to defend a distinction between taste and flavor perception when the latter involves 
contributions from many kinds of stimuli. (See also Smith 2015.) 
Spence, Charles, and Betina Piqueras-Fiszman. The Perfect Meal: The Multisensory Science of 
Food and Dining. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014. [ISBN: 9781118490822] 
Provides a psychological perspective not only of taste and smell, but also of how all of our 
senses contribute to the multisensory experience of eating and dining in a cultural context. A 
sourcebook for those interested in the scientific research behind multisensory dining and 
molecular gastronomy. 
Stevenson, Richard J. The Psychology of Flavour. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
[ISBN: 9780199539352] 
Extensive treatment of the psychology and biology of flavor-perception, including its function, 
the structure of the “flavor system,” interactions with memory and learning, and flavor 
hedonics. 
Audition 
O’Callaghan 2014 and Nudds 2015 offer detailed overviews of the central questions in the 
philosophy of audition, including the objects and contents of auditory experience and the 
metaphysics of sounds (cf. Pasnau 1999, Matthen 2010, and Kulvicki 2017). O’Callaghan 2007 
details the author’s event-based view and contrasts it with those of Casati and Dokic 1994, which 
locates sounds at their sources, and Nudds and O’Callaghan 2010, which offers a wide-ranging 
collection of recent essays relating to auditory, music, and speech perception (see also chapter 25 
on “Speech Perception” and chapter 26 on “Musical Perception” in Matthen 2015, cited under 
 *Anthologies and Reference: Philosophy*). The biological and psychological mechanisms that 
underpin human hearing and auditory processing are relatively well understood and are described 
in detail in Bregman 1990, a highly influential theory of auditory scene analysis (see chapter 4, 
“Sounds and Space,” in Nudds and O’Callaghan 2009 for philosophical commentary). The 
spatial characteristics of auditory experience, however, remain controversial, and the perception 
of auditory space via reverberation effects is discussed by Young 2017. (See also Pasnau 1999.) 
Bregman, Albert S. Auditory Scene Analysis: The Perceptual Organization of Sound. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. [ISBN: 9780262022972] 
A detailed and wide-ranging scientific treatment of the human auditory system, covering 
psychoacoustics, speech and music perception, and computer modeling. Although somewhat 
technical, chapters 1 through 4 are particularly useful for philosophers wishing to gain a 
detailed understanding of the mechanisms that underlie auditory processing. 
Casati, Roberto, and Jérôme Dokic. La philosophie du son. Nîmes, France: Chambon, 1994. 
[ISBN: 9782877111096] 
Defends the view that sounds are events that happen to material objects and thus are spatially 
located at their sources. In the authors’ view, auditory experiences can represent both sounds 
and movement, but do not represent sounds as moving. Rather, they are represented as being 
veridically located at their origins (cf. O’Callaghan 2007 and Nudds 2015). An English 
translation is available via *the HAL open archive[https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/]*. 
Kulvicki, John. “Auditory Perspectives.” In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. 
Edited by Bence Nanay, 83–94. New York and London: Routledge, 2017. [ISBN: 
9781138840072] 
Argues against the widespread view that sounds are the objects of auditory experience, which 
renders audition perceptually indirect in a way that is disanalogous to vision. Instead, drawing 
on an analogy with Thomas Reid’s notion of “visible figure,” Kulvicki argues that sounds 
should be regarded as the “audible profiles” of objects, split from their sources only at the level 
of properties rather than being distinct objects in their own right (cf. Pasnau 1999). 
Matthen, Mohan. “On the Diversity of Auditory Objects.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 
1 (2010): 63–89. [doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0018-z] 
Defends a view of audition according to which humans directly hear not only sounds, but also 
“composites” of sounds, including “melodies, harmonies, sequences of phonemes, individual 
voices,” (p. 63) and so on. Consequently, according to Matthen, the objects of auditory 
experience are both non-heterogenous and non-atomistic in the sense that sounds “have no 
priority from the perspective of audition” (ibid.) over their composites. 
Nudds, Matthew. “Audition.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Edited by 
Mohan Matthen, 274–293. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199600472] 
A good overview of some of the fundamental questions in the philosophy of audition. Focuses 
on the distinction between hearing sounds, and hearing the objects and events that produce 
them. Also touches on the metaphysical nature of sounds, event-based views of sounds, and the 
representational content of auditory experiences. 
Nudds, Matthew, and Casey O’Callaghan, eds. Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical 
Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. [ISBN: 9780199282968] 
An excellent collection of recent essays on auditory perception covering, among others, the 
nature of auditory objects, event-based theories of sounds and audition, the perception of 
spatial location, the motor theory of speech perception, and whether a person can “hear” 
silences. 
 O’Callaghan, Casey. Sounds: A Philosophical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
[ISBN: 9780199215928] 
Offers a detailed account of the metaphysics of sound, hearing, and auditory experience 
according to which sounds are events located at or near their sources and include the medium 
of transmission. O’Callaghan argues that this provides the best account of a diverse range of 
auditory phenomena, including echoes, reverberation and Doppler effects, and defends a 
robustly multisensory approach to auditory and other sense perception. 
O’Callaghan, Casey. “*Auditory 
Perception[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/perception-auditory/]*.” In The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2014. 
A good starting point for further reading, with an extensive bibliography covering the objects 
and contents of auditory perception, the analogy between sound and color, different forms of 
auditory perception including speech and musical or “acousmatic” listening, and auditory 
crossmodal phenomena, such as the McGurk effect in which visual stimuli seemingly affect the 
sounds which are “heard”. 
Pasnau, Robert. “What Is Sound?” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 309–324. 
An extended discussion of the metaphysics of sound and auditory experience in which Pasnau 
argues that there is an incoherence in our ordinary conception of sounds, which are held to be 
both sensible properties of objects as well as objects in their own right. According to Pasnau, 
the latter renders the spatial aspect of auditory experiences illusory and thus should be rejected, 
rendering audition both perceptually direct and capable of veridicality (cf. Kulvicki 2017). 
Young, Nick. “Hearing Spaces.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2017): 242–255. 
[doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1164202] 
A stimulating article on the auditory perception of space that argues humans perceive the size 
and shape of acoustic spaces on the basis of their reverberant characteristics. Young rejects 
alternative accounts that treat reverberations—an often-neglected feature of auditory stimuli—
as sounds in their own right, echoes, or properties of other sounds, respectively (cf. Richardson 
2010, cited under *Sensory Modalities: Vision*, on the perception of visual space). 
Touch 
Fulkerson 2016 and Vignemont and Massin 2015 provide an overview of the philosophical 
issues surrounding the sense of touch and also discuss its relation to bodily awareness. Fulkerson 
2014 offers an in-depth empirically informed treatment of touch and also defends the idea that 
touch and its submodalities of pressure, texture, temperature, and various forms of affective 
touch should be considered a single unified sensory modality (see also Fulkerson 2014, cited 
under *Individuating the Senses*). Lederman and Klatzky 2009 gives further details of the 
neurological basis of touch and the nature of haptic touch, and Gallace and Spence 2014 
considers consider its interaction with other sensory modalities. O’Shaughnessy 1989 gives an 
influential account of the phenomenology of touch, and his ideas concerning the mediating role 
of bodily sensations are further developed by Martin 1992 and Richardson 2011. (See also 
Martin 1993, cited under *Bodily Awareness*.) 
Fulkerson, Matthew. The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of Human Touch. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2014. [ISBN: 9780262019965] 
An extensive, empirically informed treatment of the sense of touch. Defends the view that 
touch is a single sensory modality and that “exploratory procedures” play a central role in both 
unifying and differentiating touch from other senses. See also Fulkerson’s contributions to 
 *The Brains Blog[http://philosophyofbrains.com/category/books/matthew-fulkerson-the-first-
sense]*. 
Fulkerson, Matthew. “*Touch[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/touch/].*” In 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2016. 
Introduces the different types of touch—haptic, cutaneous, and thermal awareness—with a 
detailed discussion of whether touch is multisensory, its relation to the other senses and to 
action, and the nature of tangible qualities. A good starting place for further reading with many 
useful references. 
Gallace, Alberto, and Charles Spence. In Touch with the Future: The Sense of Touch from 
Cognitive Neuroscience to Virtual Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. [ISBN: 
9780199644469] 
A cognitive neuroscientific account of tactual perception, its neurological basis, and its role in 
interpersonal interactions, sex, eating, technology, and marketing. Emphasizes the multisensory 
context and nature of touch (cf. Fulkerson 2014). 
Lederman, S. J., and R. L. Klatzky. “Haptic Perception: A Tutorial.” Attention, Perception, & 
Psychophysics 71 (2009): 1439–1459. [doi:10.3758/APP.71.7.1439] 
A comprehensive tutorial review of the mechanisms of haptic touch, which receives inputs 
from both tactile and kinesthetic subsystems, thereby enabling active exploration of objects. In 
addition to being an excellent starting point and source of further reading about the distinction 
between tactile and active touch, the authors also discuss the existence of “what” and “where” 
channels for touch, interactions between touch and vision, and affective touch. (See also 
Fulkerson 2014 and Gibson 1988 [the latter cited under *Crossmodal Phenomena: Other 
Crossmodal Phenomena*].) 
Martin, Michael. “Sight and Touch.” In The Contents of Experience. Edited by Tim Crane, 196–
215. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. [ISBN: 9780521173179] 
In the context of a comparison between the experience of space across visual and tactile 
modalities, Martin presents an influential account of the phenomenology of touch that rules out 
the existence of a “tactual field,” analogous to the visual field. (See also Richardson 2011 and 
Martin 1993 [the latter cited under *Bodily Awareness*].) 
O’Shaughnessy, Brian. “The Sense of Touch.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1989): 
37–58. 
An extremely rich paper that anticipates many of the current debates about touch. 
O’Shaughnessy offers a nuanced account of the phenomenology of touch arguing that, 
uniquely among the senses, touch and bodily awareness draw on “innate knowledge” and so 
are epistemically interdependent. 
Richardson, Louise. “Bodily Sensation and Tactile Perception.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 86 (2011): 134–154. 
Develops the account by O’Shaughnessy 1989 of the relation between bodily sensations and 
touch, arguing that such sensations both “mediate” and suffice for a sense of touch, although 
not in a way that renders tactual perception epistemically indirect. (See also Martin 1992.) 
Vignemont, Frédérique de, and Olivier Massin. “Touch.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Perception. Edited by Mohan Matthen, 294–313. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
[ISBN: 9780199600472] 
Provides an overview of the philosophical literature on touch, with extensive discussion of its 
relation to bodily awareness, including proprioception, and the felt location of tactile sensations 
as explained by “body template” and “body map” theories of touch. 
 Bodily Awareness 
Closely related to, but distinct from, the sense of touch are the collection of sensory modalities 
that enables us to determine the position, movement, and internal condition of our bodies. These 
various forms of what has become collectively known as “bodily awareness” (see Vignemont 
2015) include proprioception (perception of body position), kinesthesis (bodily movement), the 
vestibular system (balance and acceleration), nociception (pain), and homeostatic regulation of 
bodily states (e.g., hunger and thirst). Ritchie and Carruthers 2015 argues that each of these 
should be considered distinct sensory modalities, rather than a single unified body-sense, 
although the divisions are controversial (see *Individuating the Senses*). Armstrong 1962 
distinguishes between “bodily sensations,” which have spatial locations, and “bodily feelings,” 
which do not, whereas Martin 1993 argues that that the felt extent of the body coincides with the 
boundaries within which bodily sensations are perceived as being located. Richardson 2015 
(cited under *Contrasting the Senses*) discusses the contrast between bodily awareness and 
other sensory modalities, and Cole 2016 (cited under *Sensory Enhancement and Deficits: 
Sensory Loss*) covers the loss of bodily awareness. 
Armstrong, David. Bodily Sensations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962. 
A short but influential book that defends a perceptual account of bodily sensations, including 
pain, bodily awareness, and various forms of touch. Introduces the distinction between “bodily 
sensations,” which are located in space, and “bodily feelings,” which are not, as well as 
“transitive” sensations that have a distinct object versus “intransitive” sensations. 
Goldberg, Jay M., Victor J. Wilson, Kathleen E. Cullen, et al. The Vestibular System: A Sixth 
Sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. [ISBN: 9780195167085] 
A detailed scientific work on the structure, physiology, and neurophysiology of the vestibular 
system, which is responsible for the sense of balance, acceleration, and deceleration. Although 
pivotal to everyday life, this sense has long been neglected by philosophers, and its 
contributions to experience and interactions with each of the other senses remain open and 
interesting questions. 
Martin, Michael. “Sense Modalities and Spatial Properties.” In Spatial Representation. Edited by 
Naomi Eilan, Rosaline McCarthy, and Bill Brewer, 206–218. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. [ISBN: 
9780631183556] 
A rich and influential account according to which bodily awareness, although not a fully 
fledged sensory modality, is intrinsically spatial, with the felt extent of the body coinciding 
with the spatial boundaries within which bodily sensations are perceived as being located. The 
latter claim, however, is subject to potential counterexamples (see Vignemont 2015, section 
5.2.1, “The Spatial Conception,” for a discussion of this). 
Ritchie, J. Brendan, and Peter Carruthers. “The Bodily Senses.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Perception. Edited by Mohan Matthen, 353–370. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199600472] 
A good, although brief, introduction to the three main classes of bodily awareness: 
interoception (internal monitoring of bodily organs), the vestibular system (balance and 
acceleration), and proprioception (bodily position and movement, or kinesthesis). The authors 
argue that each of these classes is constituted by a collection of distinct sensory modalities 
rather than being a single unified sense. 
Vignemont, Frédérique de. “*Bodily 
Awareness[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/bodily-awareness/]*.” In The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2015. 
 An extensive overview of the phenomenology and epistemology of bodily awareness 
(awareness of the positions and movements of one’s body) and bodily ownership (the sense of 
“mine-ness” that normally accompanies it). These can become dissociated in conditions such 
as somatoparaphrenia (“alien hand syndrome”) and anosognosia for hemiplegia, in which 
subjects experience apparent bodily movement even though paralyzed. 
Pain 
As documented by Dallenbach 1939 (cited under *Individuating the Senses*), pain occupies a 
somewhat unusual place in the philosophy of perception. Considered by some philosophers to be 
a paradigm case of mere sensation rather than perception proper and by others to be a 
submodality of touch, the sensation of pain (or painfulness) should be distinguished from 
nociception—the sensory system responsible for the detection of harmful or noxious stimuli—
marking an asymmetry with pleasure, which is not normally considered a sensory modality (cf. 
Lederman and Klatzky 2009, cited under *Sensory Modalities: Touch*, on affective touch). For 
extensive bibliographical references and discussion, see Bain 2015 and Aydede 2013, both of 
which provide overviews of the main theories of pain, including intentionalism (Tye 1995), 
evaluatism (Bain 2015), and imperativism (Klein 2015). The historically popular, but now 
largely abandoned, “intensive theory of pain” is defended by Gray 2014. Corns 2017 gives a 
comprehensive and in-depth treatment of the central issues in the philosophy and science of pain, 
whereas Melzack and Wall 2008 is the definitive reference work for the psychology and 
physiology of pain. Grahek 2007 provides an accessible and engaging introduction to the 
philosophical issues, including the relevance of various pathologies, such as pain asymbolia, that 
have motivated a resurgence of interest in this topic. 
Aydede, Murat. “*Pain[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/pain/]*.” In The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2013. 
A comprehensive and accessible overview of the philosophy of pain. Introduces perceptual, 
representational, and eliminativist theories of pain along with some of the leading 
representational views—intentionalism, evaluatism, and imperativism—plus an extensive 
bibliography and links to other useful resources. 
Bain, David. “*Pain[obo-9780195396577-0280]*.” In Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. [class:dataSetItem-database] 
A detailed and extensive bibliography of leading philosophical and scientific works on pain. 
Includes sections on the nature and phenomenology of pain, its spatial characteristics, affective 
dimension, perceptual and representational views—including some of Bain’s other work that 
defends a form of evaluatism—and pain disorders, such as asymbolia. 
Corns, Jennifer, ed. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 
2017. [ISBN: 9781138823181] 
An updated collection of essays on the philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology of pain. 
Containing contributions from leading subject experts and divided into sections on the nature 
of pain and its theoretical and practical implications, this volume provides a comprehensive 
introduction and reference to the philosophy and science of pain. 
Grahek, Nikola. Feeling Pain and Being in Pain. 2d ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. 
[ISBN: 9780262072830] 
Excellent and highly readable introduction to the philosophy of pain. The first edition, 
published in 2001, was partly responsible for highlighting clinical evidence for the 
 dissociability of pain from its affective components (e.g., unpleasantness) in conditions such as 
pain asymbolia, generating a resurgence of philosophical interest in the topic. 
Gray, Richard. “Pain Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory.” 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2014): 87–101. 
Argues against sensory or perceptual accounts of pain in favor of the historically popular 
“intensive theory of pain,” also discussed by Dallenbach 1939 (cited under *Individuating the 
Senses*), in which pains represent the excessive stimulation of sense-organs. 
Klein, Colin. What the Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780262029704] 
A sophisticated defense of the imperative theory of pain, according to which pains are 
“intrinsically motivating” sensations, the contents of which have the form of a command, 
thereby explaining their close links with action. See Bain 2015 for further reading and 
alternative views, including Bain’s evaluative account. 
Melzack, Ronald, and Patrick D. Wall. The Challenge of Pain. 2d ed. London: Penguin, 2008. 
[ISBN: 9780140256703] 
A classic reference work and comprehensive introduction to the science of pain. Parts 1 and 2 
focus on the psychology and physiology of pain, and Part 3 presents various theories of pain, 
including Melzack and Wall’s famous “gate-control” mechanism. Part 4 addresses methods of 
pain control. Essential reading for those wishing to engage with the physiological and 
psychological literature on pain. 
Tye, Michael. “A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character.” 
Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995): 223–239. 
Defends a form of intentionalism about pain according to which pains represents bodily 
damage, with their phenomenal character supervening on this representational content. An 
influential early exponent of the perceptual-representational approach, Tye has since switched 
to endorsing evaluatism. 
Vision 
As noted in the introduction to *Sensory Modalities*, philosophers writing about perception 
have tended to focus primarily, and sometimes exclusively, on vision. Hilbert 2015 provides a 
comprehensive overview on vision. Other works highlight some of the distinctive features of 
vision, such as the role of color (Macpherson 2015), the experience of empty space (Richardson 
2010), the representation of high-level properties in visual experience (Siegel 2006), the diversity 
of vision (Hughes, et al. 2015), and the dominance of vision over other sensory modalities 
(Stokes and Biggs 2015). In the psychological literature, the historical influence of Gibson 1979 
and Marr 1982 cannot be overstated, and both provide useful theoretical background for 
understanding contemporary scientific debates. The varieties of animal vision are discussed by 
Lazareva, et al. 2012 (see also *Nonhuman Senses*). For representation of space in the visual 
system, see Part V of Eilan, et al. 1993 (pp. 269–399), cited under *Crossmodal Phenomena: 
Other Crossmodal Phenomena*. For loss of vision, see Magee and Milligan 1998, cited under 
*Sensory Enhancement and Deficits: Sensory Loss*. 
Gibson, James J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1979. [ISBN: 9780395270493] 
A classic and highly influential work in perceptual psychology which applies the ecological 
approach to vision presented in Gibson 1966 (cited under *Anthologies and Reference: 
Psychology and Neuroscience*). In contrast to the computational approach of Marr 1982, 
 Gibson emphasizes the embodied and embedded nature of human and animal vision, along 
with its close links with action, introducing the notions of the “ambient optic array,” optic flow, 
information pickup, and the theory of affordances. 
Hilbert, David R. “Vision.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Edited by 
Mohan Matthen, 257–273. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199600472] 
Provides an excellent overview of the philosophical and scientific issues concerning visual 
perception, covering basic optics, visual processing, and the neuropsychology of vision, as well 
as the objects and contents of visual experience and vision’s relation to action. A good starting 
point for further reading. 
Hughes, Howard C., Robert Fendrich, and Sarah E. Streeter. “The Diversity of Human Visual 
Experience.” In Perception and Its Modalities. Edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and 
Stephen Biggs, 297–326. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
An accessible paper that provides an overview of some diverse visual phenomena and sensory 
deficits, including gist perception, change blindness, blindsight, and the plasticity of the visual 
cortex. The authors highlight the interplay between externally generated sensory signals and 
internal processes, including the deployment of attention and observer expectancies, in 
generating visual experience. 
Lazareva, Olga F., Toru Shimizu, and Edward A. Wasserman, eds. How Animals See the World: 
Comparative Behavior, Biology, and Evolution of Vision. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012. [ISBN: 9780195334654] 
A detailed and comprehensive anthology on the science of animal vision across a wide variety 
of species, including insects, spiders, fish, birds, and primates. Draws on the latest 
neuroscience, cognitive science, and behavioral science, with sections on various aspects of 
perceptual processing, object perception, attention, and the evolution of the visual system. 
Macpherson, Fiona. “The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 
Blindsight.” Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015): 104–128. 
Argues that, contrary to Aristotle and some 21st-century philosophers, color is not a necessary, 
or “structural,” feature of visual experience. If correct, this has implications for whether certain 
forms of blindsight and other novel cases should be classified as involving a kind of visual 
experience, albeit one that does not include the experience of color. 
Marr, David. Vision. New York: Freeman, 1982. [ISBN: 9780716715672] 
In contrast to Gibson 1979, Marr considers vision to be an essentially computational process in 
which information is processed via a series of modules, each of which outputs representations 
of the external world ranging from elementary visual features to a “2.5-D sketch,” and, 
ultimately, 3-D objects. Marr’s framework, which posits distinct computational, algorithmic, 
and implementation levels of analysis, remains highly influential in the fields of perceptual 
science and artificial intelligence. 
Richardson, Louise. “Seeing Empty Space.” European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010): 227–
243. 
Argues that there is a link between “seeing” the empty space between objects, as opposed to 
seeing those objects themselves, and the existence of a visual field, i.e., a spatially structured 
region or array that is bounded by our sensory limitations. (See also Martin 1992, cited under 
*Touch*, and Young 2017, cited under *Audition*.) 
Siegel, Susanna. “Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?” In Perceptual Experience. 
Edited by Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne, 481–503. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. [ISBN: 9780199289769] 
 Considers whether properties other than shape, color, illumination, and motion are represented 
by visual experiences. Assuming a representational view of experience, Siegel argues that it is 
plausible that some visual experiences represent “kind” properties, such as being a pine tree, 
that make a phenomenological difference to their qualitative character. 
Stokes, Dustin, and Stephen Biggs. “The Dominance of the Visual.” In Perception and Its 
Modalities. Edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, 350–378. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
Examines one way in which vision may be considered special among the senses in terms of its 
dominance over audition, touch, and other modalities in a range of psychologically and 
epistemically significant ways. Includes a discussion of multisensory illusions, such as the 
McGurk effect (see O’Callaghan 2014, cited under *Sensory Modalities: Audition*), 
multisensory integration, and mental imagery. 
Other Human Senses 
In addition to the five Aristotelian senses, plus pain and various forms of bodily awareness, a 
wide variety of other, often-controversial sensory modalities have been posited. These include 
Aristotle’s notion of a “common sense” (sensus communis) that unites and monitors the other 
senses (Gregoric 2011); the sense of one’s own actions and agency (Bayne 2011); the moral 
sense (originally proposed by Hutcheson 2002, although the perception of moral, ethical, and 
aesthetic properties via the other senses is also defended by Audi 2013); the perception of time 
and temporal properties (Phillips 2014); vomeronasal or pheromone perception (Meredith 2001 
and Watson 1999, the latter cited under *Olfaction*); and various forms of “extrasensory” 
perception (Howes 2009). Whether any of these genuinely constitute forms of sensory 
awareness, as opposed to falling under a broader, more metaphorical use of the term “sense,” 
will depend on the precise criteria used to identify the senses (see *Individuating the Senses* for 
further discussion). For an overview of attempts to identify additional senses, as well as 
additional anthropological and cultural context, see Howes 2009 and Rivlin and Gravelle 1984. 
Audi, Robert. Moral Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. [ISBN: 
9780691156484] 
Defends a form of moral intuitionism, i.e., the perception of evaluative properties, such as 
goodness, badness, and beauty, as an element of sensory experience. Audi focuses on the 
connections among moral or aesthetic intuitions, moral knowledge, and the emotions. For the 
moral sense, see Hutcheson 2002. 
Bayne, Tim. “The Sense of Agency.” In The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical 
Perspectives. Edited by Fiona Macpherson, 355–374. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011. [ISBN: 9780195385960] 
Argues that the experience of agency through self-generated actions, or “agentive self-
awareness,” is best thought of as a genuine sensory modality. Bayne argues that the alternative 
cognitive and telic (i.e., action-based) accounts each suffer from serious defects and, therefore, 
the perceptual model should at least be regarded as a viable option. 
Gregoric, Pavel. Aristotle on the Common Sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. [ISBN: 
9780199277377] 
A detailed examination of Aristotle’s account of the “common sense” (sensus communis), a 
higher-order perceptual capacity that unites and monitors the five senses—a notion not unlike 
the role of multisensory integration (see *Multisensory Perception*) in modern perceptual 
 psychology. Also provides a good overview of Aristotle’s theory of perception and its relation 
to psychological theories throughout the Middle Ages and Early Modern periods. 
Howes, David, ed. The Sixth Sense Reader. Oxford: Berg, 2009. [ISBN: 9781847882615] 
Anthology that explores the search for a “sixth sense” and its dependence on, and interaction 
with, cultural factors. Includes articles on extrasensory perception (ESP) and mysticism, 
dreams, visions, and the feeling of being stared at, as well as more familiar cases of vestibular, 
temperature, muscle, and directional senses. (See also Rivlin and Gravelle 1984.) 
Hutcheson, Francis. *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, with Illustrations on 
the Moral Sense[http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/885]*. Edited by Aaron Garrett. Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 2002. [ISBN: 9780865973879] [class:dataSetItem-database] 
A historical defense of the moral sense with which we “feel” the value of actions, originally 
published in 1742. Hutcheson was an influence on David Hume and Adam Smith and thought 
of the moral sense as a separate faculty, along with vision, touch, and so on, as well as distinct 
from both emotion and reasoning, the latter of which could both influence and be influenced by 
it. For moral and aesthetic perception more generally, see Audi 2013. 
Meredith, Michael. “Human Vomeronasal Organ Function: A Critical Review of Best and Worst 
Cases.” Chemical Senses 26 (2001): 433–445. 
Reviews the evidence for pheromone perception in humans, i.e., the sensing of human-
generated chemicals, whether consciously or otherwise, focusing on whether humans have a 
functional vomeronasal organ (VNO)—sometimes called “Jacobson’s organ”—located within 
the nose (cf. Watson 1999, cited under *Olfaction*). Although the physiological and 
behavioral evidence for this remains highly controversial, VNOs are known to be present in 
many other animal species and, indeed, in human embryos. 
Phillips, Ian. “Experience of and in Time.” Philosophy Compass 9 (2014): 131–144. 
[doi:10.1111/phc3.12107] 
Reviews some of the literature on the perception of temporal properties such as succession, 
duration, and change, and what, if any, implications this has for the temporal structure of 
experience. Phillips argues that the temporal properties that humans experience are “inherited” 
from the temporal structure of experience itself—e.g., one event being experienced before 
another—and that the arguments advanced to the contrary are unconvincing. 
Rivlin, Robert, and Karen Gravelle. Deciphering the Senses: The Expanding World of Human 
Perception. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. [ISBN: 9780671461249] 
An examination of the anthropology of the senses, in particular, cross-cultural approaches to 
counting the senses beyond the standard Aristotelian five (taste, sight, touch, smell, and 
hearing). Contains chapters on *Pain*, the development of the human sensory system, 
nonverbal sensory communication, and extrasensory perception. (See also Howes 2009.) 
Nonhuman Senses 
Among nonhuman species, animals possess many novel and unusual senses, as well as variations 
on, and extensions of, familiar human senses. Perhaps the sense most discussed in the 
philosophical literature is echolocation in bats, which is examined in detail from empirical and 
philosophical perspectives by Akins 1993. Many other fascinating cases, however, can be found 
in Hughes 1999, with a broader discussion of a range of issues in animal cognition, including 
sensory perception, in Andrews and Beck 2018. Keeley 2015 examines the relevance of 
nonhuman sensory modalities to philosophical questions concerning the nature and individuation 
of the senses (see *Individuating the Senses*), both in humans and nonhumans more generally. 
 For an in-depth account of the science of animal vision, see Lazareva, et al. 2012. For smell in 
humans, animals, and plants, see Watson 1999, cited under *Olfaction*. 
Akins, Kathleen. “What Is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic?” In Dennett and His Critics. Edited 
by Bo Dahlbom, 124–160. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993. [ISBN: 9780631185499] 
Explores bats’ experience of echolocation, through the latest scientific and philosophical 
considerations. Akins argues that Thomas Nagel’s question of “What it is like to be a bat?” 
(Philosophical Review 83 [1974]: 435–450) is ambiguous between “What is the phenomenal 
character of bats’ echolocation experience?” and “What is the bat’s point of view?” Akin 
concludes that bats may lack the latter on the basis that they do not experience particulars, 
despite their experience having phenomenal character. 
Andrews, Kristin, and Jacob Beck, eds. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal 
Minds. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. [ISBN: 9781138822887] 
A comprehensive collection on the philosophy and psychology of animal cognition, containing 
nearly fifty chapters on topics ranging from mental representation to animal consciousness and 
culture. Contributions that relate specifically to the senses include articles by Mohan Matthen 
(pp. 65–75) and Derek Brown (pp. 76–85) on animal color perception, Sean Allen-Hermanson 
on phenomenal character, Adam Shriver on the unpleasantness of pain in animals, and Maria 
Botero on touch and social cognition in chimpanzees. 
Hughes, Howard C. Sensory Exotica: A World beyond Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999. [ISBN: 9780262582049] 
A comprehensive and accessible guide to nonhuman sensory modalities. Divided into four 
sections focusing on (1) the physiological and anatomical principles underlying biosonar, or 
echolocation; (2) biological compasses, e.g., magnetoreception; (3) electroperception; and (4) 
chemical communication, respectively. A good starting point for the nonspecialist. 
Keeley, Brian L. “Nonhuman Animal Senses.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Perception. Edited by Mohan Matthen, 853–870. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
[ISBN: 9780199600472] 
Considers the relationship between the senses of human and animals, arguing that the two are, 
in important ways, continuous with one another. Drawing on scientific evidence concerning 
infrared reception and magnetoreception, Keeley concludes that much work remains to address 
conceptual and metatheoretical questions in the philosophy of nonhuman perception. 
Lazareva, Olga F., Toru Shimizu, and Edward A. Wasserman, eds. How Animals See the World: 
Comparative Behavior, Biology, and Evolution of Vision. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012. [ISBN: 9780195334654] 
Multidisciplinary collection on the science and diversity of vision across the animal kingdom. 
Sections cover (1) perceptual grouping and segmentation; (2) luminance, contrast, and spatial 
and temporal resolution; (3) object perception and recognition; (4) motion perception; (5) 
visual attention; and (6) different dimensions of visual perception. A detailed and valuable 
reference work. 
CROSSMODAL PHENOMENA 
Since the late 20th century, psychologists and philosophers increasingly have become interested 
in how individual sensory modalities combine and interact to create a “multisensory” experience 
of the world. *Multisensory Perception* includes some of the key works that deal with that 
topic, including multisensory integration and the nature of crossmodal (or multimodal) 
experiences. *Synesthesia* discusses specific philosophical issues relating to this condition in 
 which subjects experience objects via one submodality, e.g., shape, as possessing properties that 
are normally associated with a different submodality, e.g., color. *Molyneux’s Question* 
concerns the mechanisms for shape representation and identification across sensory modalities. 
*Other Crossmodal Phenomena* covers crossmodal attention, spatial representation, crossmodal 
correspondences, and crossmodal imagery. For general scientific background, see Calvert, et al. 
2004 and Stein 2012. For comparisons between sensory modalities, see *Contrasting the 
Senses*. 
Multisensory Perception 
The topic of multisensory perception— i.e., perception involving two or more distinct sensory 
modalities—may be further subdivided into the study of multisensory experience (Macpherson 
ed. 2011) and the multisensory processing that underpins it (Briscoe 2016). Furthermore, 
although the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, many philosophers and 
psychologists draw a distinction between multisensory integration, either at the level of 
experience or multisensory processing, and crossmodal effects in which processing of 
information from one modality causally affects processing or experience in another modality (see 
Connolly 2014). Although it is now widely accepted that perceptual experience is multisensory 
(see Bayne and Spence 2015, O’Callaghan 2017, and Matthen 2017) and involves some form of 
multisensory integration or binding, Spence and Bayne 2015 strikes a note of caution concerning 
the empirical evidence for this claim. For a cross-section of recent scientific research on 
multisensory perception, see Calvert, et al. 2004 and Stein 2012, both of which are somewhat 
technical and may be difficult for the nonspecialist. Chen and Vroomen 2013 provides an 
accessible overview of the role of space and time in intersensory binding. For discussion of the 
philosophical issues raised by various forms of multisensory perception, see Bennett and Hill 
2014 and Stokes, et al. 2015. 
Bayne, Tim, and Charles Spence. “Multisensory Perception.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Perception. Edited by Mohan Matthen, 603–620. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199600472] 
Provides an overview of various forms of multisensory perception and their philosophical 
implications for debates concerning modularity, perceptual content, and the structure of 
consciousness. Contains an extensive bibliography. (For a contrasting view, see Spence and 
Bayne 2015.) 
Bennett, David, and Christopher Hill, eds. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014. [ISBN: 9780262027786] 
A wide-ranging collection of papers on a variety of topics relating to multisensory perception. 
Chapters dealing specifically with multisensory integration are “The Multisensory Nature of 
Perceptual Consciousness” by Tim Bayne (pp. 15–36), “Intermodal Binding Awareness” by 
Casey O’Callaghan (pp. 73–104), “Multimodal Unity and Multimodal Binding” by Frédérique 
de Vignemont (pp. 125–150), and “Modeling Multisensory Integration” by Loes C. J. van 
Dam, et al. (pp. 209–229). 
Briscoe, Robert Eamon. “Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I.” 
Philosophy Compass 11 (2016): 121–133. 
An excellent introduction to the mechanisms of multisensory processing, integration, 
perceptual adaptation, and crossmodal spatial attention. Differentiates between the causal 
influences “optimizing” and “generative” multisensory integration in which only the latter 
 gives rise to the representation of new kinds of properties, e.g., in flavor perception (see 
*Sensory Modalities: Taste and Flavor*). 
Calvert, Gemma A., Charles Spence, and Barry E. Stein, eds. The Handbook of Multisensory 
Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. [ISBN: 9780262033213] 
An influential collection of psychological and neuroscientific studies on multisensory 
perception. Some of these studies have since been supplanted by recent research, but this 
remains a valuable and important reference volume, although highly technical in places. (See 
also Stein 2012.) 
Chen, Lihan, and Jean Vroomen, “Intersensory Binding across Space and Time: A Tutorial 
Review.” Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics 75 (2013): 790–811. [doi:10.3758/s13414-
013-0475-4] 
Presents an overview of the scientific literature on the way in which space and time affect the 
binding of stimuli across multiple sensory modalities, creating spatial and temporal 
“ventriloquism” effects that last beyond the immediately presented stimuli. Also examines the 
role of attention in multisensory binding and the criteria for intersensory pairing. 
Connolly, Kevin. “Making Sense of Multiple Senses.” In Consciousness Inside and Out: 
Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Edited by Richard Brown, 351–
364. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Netherlands, 2014. [ISBN: 9789400760004] 
Argues that the existence of crossmodal effects, such as the McGurk effect, or motion-bounce 
illusion does not require the content of the relevant experiences to be fundamentally 
multimodal. Instead, Connolly argues that crossmodal experiences may involve unimodal 
content plus an additional amodal component that is nonmodality specific. 
Macpherson, Fiona. “Cross-Modal Experiences.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 
(2011): 429–468. 
Uses the various criteria for individuating the senses described in Macpherson ed. 2011 and 
Macpherson 2015 (cited under *Individuating the Senses*) to construct an exhaustive 
taxonomy of unimodal and crossmodal experiences, according to which a given experience 
may be unimodal or crossmodal in some, but not all, respects. 
Matthen, Mohan. “Is Perceptual Experience Normally Multimodal?” In Current Controversies in 
Philosophy of Perception. Edited by Bence Nanay, 121–135. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2017. [ISBN: 9781138840072] 
Defends the view that perceptual experience is “richly multimodal” in O’Callaghan’s sense that 
“(a) it is not co-consciousness of separate unisensory states, and (b) its content is not the mere 
conjunction of the content of unisensory states” (p. 123). Matthen rejects the “atomist” view 
that the senses assign logically independent properties to the objects of experience in favor of a 
multimodal (as opposed to amodal) view of our experience of space and time. 
O’Callaghan, Casey. “Enhancement through Coordination.” In Current Controversies in 
Philosophy of Perception. Edited by Bence Nanay, 109–120. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2017. [ISBN: 9781138840072] 
Defines a number of different ways in which experience might be multisensory, arguing that 
mature human experience is “richly multisensory” on the basis that it draws on multiple senses 
to improve accuracy (cf. Matthen 2017). Consequently, according to O’Callaghan, sensory 
experiences are not subdivisible into multiple unimodal parts, nor does characterizing an 
experience as being in one particular modality preclude that it is also in another. 
 Spence, Charles, and Tim Bayne. “Is Consciousness Multisensory?” In Perception and Its 
Modalities. Edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, 95–132. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
Examines the debate between multisensory and unisensory views of the architecture of 
consciousness, and how this issue might be settled. Somewhat controversially, Spence and 
Bayne conclude that evidence for the multisensory view is “surprisingly elusive” (p. 122) as 
most of the current data can also be explained by rapid switching between modalities, as 
opposed to experiences associated with distinct modalities at the same time (see also Spence 
and Bayne 2015). 
Stein, Barry E., ed. The New Handbook of Multisensory Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2012. [ISBN: 9780262017121] 
An extensive collection of papers on the psychology and neuroscience of multisensory 
processing. Includes sections on multisensory integration, perceptual learning, attention, 
communication, and speech, with helpful section-level introductions written by subject experts. 
(See also Calvert, et al. 2004.) 
Stokes, Dustin, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, eds. Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
A collection of recent philosophical work, including a section on multimodal perception. 
Chapters include “Is Consciousness Multisensory?” by Charles Spence and Tim Bayne (pp. 
95–132); “Not All Perceptual Experience Is Modality Specific” by Casey O’Callaghan (pp. 
133–165); and “Is Audio-Visual Perception ‘Amodal’ or ‘Crossmodal’?” by Matthew Nudds 
(pp. 166–188), also cited under *Other Crossmodal Phenomena*. 
Synesthesia 
The precise definition of synesthesia, along with its status as a unified condition as opposed to a 
family of related phenomena, is controversial (see Macpherson 2007 and Deroy 2017). However, 
it may be loosely characterized as a condition in which experiences in one sensory modality 
(e.g., audition) are always accompanied by what would be for most people seemingly unrelated 
experiences in another modality (e.g., vision). Additionally, there are forms of synesthesia in 
which experiences in one modality may be accompanied by elements of experiences in that same 
modality. For example, in grapheme-color synesthesia, letters and numbers are visually 
experienced as possessing characteristic colors unrelated to the color of ink used to print them. 
The extent to which synesthesia may be due to memory-based effects is, however, controversial 
(see Brogaard, et al. 2014; Ward and Mattingley 2006). Other topics of philosophical interest 
include whether synesthesia provides a counterexample to various forms of functionalism 
(Macpherson 2007), whether synesthetic experiences are reducible to a combination of ordinary 
senses experiences or are sui generis (Auvray and Deroy 2015) or represent high-level properties 
(Matey 2014), and the condition’s implications for modularity and feature-binding (Brogaard, et 
al. 2014). For accessible introductions to the neuroscientific and genetic basis of synesthesia, see 
Cytowic and Eagleman 2009, Baron-Cohen and Harrison 1997, and Simner and Hubbard 2013. 
The implications of synesthesia for art and literature are discussed in Campen 2007. 
Auvray, Malika, and Ophelia Deroy. “How Do Synaesthetes Experience the World?” In The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Edited by Mohan Matthen, 640–658. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199600472] 
Examines different forms of synesthesia,, which the authors define as involving a distinctive 
kind of conscious state that is not reducible to combinations of ordinary non-synesthetic 
 experiences (the so-called dual model). Also considers, based on their representational and 
functional profiles, whether these states should be considered exclusively perceptual. (See also 
Macpherson 2007.) 
Baron-Cohen, Simon, and John E. Harrison, eds. Synaesthesia: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1997. [ISBN: 9780631197638] 
A wide-ranging collection of papers from modern cognitive neuroscience, developmental 
neurobiology, and clinical reports of various forms of synesthesia. 
Brogaard, Berit, Kristian Marlow, and Kevin Rice. “The Long-Term Potentiation Model for 
Grapheme-Color Binding in Synaesthesia.” In Sensory Integration and the Unity of 
Consciousness. Edited by David Bennett and Christopher Hill, 37–72. Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2014. [ISBN: 9780262027786] 
Reviews the recent empirical literature on grapheme-color synesthesia and proposes a 
mechanism for at least some forms of this condition that is grounded in memory. Also 
examines the wider philosophical implications of synesthesia for modularity and feature 
binding. 
Campen, Crétien van. The Hidden Sense: Synesthesia in Art and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2007. 
Examines the implications of synesthesia from the dual perspectives of science and the arts. 
Campen considers what the function of synesthesia might be and what, if anything, this can 
explain about ordinary, non-synesthetic sensory experience. 
Cytowic, Richard E., and David M. Eagleman. Wednesday Is Indigo Blue: Discovering the Brain 
of Synesthesia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. [ISBN: 9780262012799] 
Accessible book on the neuroscientific and genetic basis of synesthesia. Cytowic’s other 
works—Synesthesia: A Union of the Senses, 2d ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), and 
The Man Who Tasted Shapes, Rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003)—were partly 
responsible for popularizing synesthesia as a legitimate topic for scientific and philosophical 
inquiry. 
Deroy, Ophelia, ed. Sensory Blending: On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017. [ISBN: 9780199688289] 
A collection of new philosophical and scientific essays examining the broader theoretical 
lessons that arise from synesthesia and related conditions. Covers the definition of synesthesia, 
the reportability of experiences, the way in which synesthetic experiences relate to other kinds 
of “sensory blending,” and the implications of such cases for an understanding of perception in 
general. 
Macpherson, Fiona. “Synaesthesia, Functionalism and Phenomenology.” In Cartographies of the 
Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Vol. 4. Edited by Mario De Caro, Francesco 
Ferretti, and Massimo Marraffa, 65–80. Studies in Brain and Mind. Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Springer, 2007. [ISBN: 9781402054440] 
Offers a disjunctive definition of synesthesia and argues that it does not, as some philosophers 
and psychologists have claimed, provide a counterexample to forms of functionalism that 
include a normative element. (See also Auvray and Deroy 2015.) 
Matey, Jennifer. “Can Blue Mean Four?” In Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. 
Edited by David Bennett and Christopher Hill, 151–170. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014. 
[ISBN: 9780262027786] 
Argues for the representation of high-level properties in visual experience on the basis of 
grapheme-color synesthesia in which subjects experience numerical figures as having colors. 
 For general background on visual representation, see Siegel 2006, cited under *Sensory 
Modalities: Vision*. 
Simner, Julia, and Edward Hubbard, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Synesthesia. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. [ISBN: 9780191750885] 
Comprehensive reference work containing contributions from many of the leading researchers 
on synesthesia. Contains sections on the origins and different types of synesthesia and its 
interaction with attention and perception, neurological basis, and crossmodality in the general 
population. 
Ward, Jamie, and Jason Mattingley. “Synaesthesia: An Overview of Contemporary Findings and 
Controversies.” Cortex 42.2 (2006): 129–136. 
A special issue of recent scientific research on synesthesia. Focusing mainly on grapheme-
color synesthesia, topics include the authenticity of the condition, its possible basis in memory, 
interactions between real and synesthetic colors, top-down versus bottom-up effects, and 
susceptibility of synesthetes to visual priming and pop-out effects. The introduction provides a 
good overview of work in the field in the early 2000s. 
Molyneux’s Question 
In his 1688 letter to John Locke, William Molyneux 1978 posed the question of whether a 
congenitally blind person whose sight was restored would be able to identify, by sight alone, 
which of two objects was a cube or a sphere. This question has since stimulated much debate 
concerning the nature of spatial representation in different modalities (for an overview, see 
Degenaar and Lokhorst 2014), including attempts to answer the question empirically, of which 
Sinha, et al. 2014 is one of the most recent and influential (see Van Cleve 2014 for a critical 
discussion). Evans 1985 (cf. Campbell 1996) argues that visual and tactile experiences share a 
common spatial frame of reference, motivating a positive response to Molyneux’s question, 
although Eilan 1993 takes this to be a contingent matter. For temporal and methodological 
variants of Molyneux’s question, see Richardson 2015 and Chirimuuta and Paterson 2015, both 
cited under *Contrasting the Senses*. 
Campbell, John. “Molyneux’s Question.” Philosophical Issues 7 (1996): 301–318. 
Analyzes Molyneux’s question in terms of a contrast between “internalist” versus “radical 
externalist” views of shape perception. According to Campbell, the former takes the 
phenomenal character of shape perception to be determined by the internal geometry of 
sensations; the latter, by amodal characteristics of external objects that in turn explain the 
crossmodal equivalences between sight and touch. 
Degenaar, Marjolein, and Gert-Jan Lokhorst. “*Molyneux’s 
Problem[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/molyneux-problem/]*.” In The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2014. 
A good introduction to, and overview of, Molyneux’s question, along with historical and 
contemporary attempts to answer the question both experimentally and theoretically. 
Eilan, Naomi M. “Molyneux’s Question and the Idea of an External World.” In Spatial 
Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Edited by Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen 
McCarthy, and Bill Brewer, 236–255. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993. [ISBN: 
9780631183556] 
Examines precisely what kinds of modality-specificity might motivate a negative answer to 
Molyneux’s question, and how the representation or “mapping” of space enables subjects both 
to reidentify and grasp the interrelation of external locations. Eilan argues that the answer to 
 Molyneux’s question is an empirical matter that turns on developmental and evolutionary 
contingencies relating to the emergence of human spatial mapping abilities. 
Evans, Gareth. “Molyneux’s Question.” In Collected Papers. Edited by Gareth Evans, 364–399. 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1985. [ISBN: 9780198236276] 
A classic paper in which Evans argues that visual and tactile experiences share a common 
spatial frame of reference due to their representing egocentric locations in a shared behavioral 
space (cf. Clark 2011, cited under *Other Crossmodal Effects*). For critical commentary, see 
John Campbell’s review of this posthumously published collection (“Collected Papers by 
Gareth Evans: Review by John Campbell,” The Journal of Philosophy 86 [1989]: 156–163). 
For discussion of Evans’s temporal variant of Molyneux’s question, see Richardson 2014. 
Molyneux, William. “William Molyneux to the Author of the Essai Philosophique concernant 
L'Entendement.” In The Correspondence of John Locke. Edited by E. S. De Beer, Vol. 3, no. 
1064, 482–483. Oxford: Clarendon, 1978. 
Molyneux’s original letter to Locke, written in 1688 following the publication of an extract of 
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in French. Though Locke never provided 
a response to Molyneux’s question, the two struck up a correspondence, and Locke included 
the question in the 1694 edition of his Essay (Degenaar and Lokhorst 2014). 
Richardson, Louise. “Space, Time and Molyneux’s Question.” Ratio 27 (2014): 483–505. 
Examines the reasons behind an apparent asymmetry between the spatial and temporal variants 
of Molyneux’s question described by Evans 1985. On the basis of phenomenological features 
of a variety of modalities, Richardson argues that perception has spatial, but not temporal, 
perspectival character, i.e., there is no distinction “between the temporal location from which 
one perceives things, and the apparent temporal location of those perceived things” (p. 502). 
Sinha, Pawan, Jonas Wulff, and Richard Held. “Establishing Cross-Modal Mappings: Empirical 
and Computational Investigations.” In Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. 
Edited by David Bennett and Christopher Hill, 171–192. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014. 
[ISBN: 9780262027786] 
Groundbreaking work based on the removal of congenital cataracts, paving the way for an 
empirical answer to Molyneux’s question, although the details remain controversial. 
Provisionally concludes that crossmodal mappings are not available at the outset of vision, but 
they require linkages to be established, typically occurring relatively rapidly as a result of early 
visual experiences. (See also Van Cleve 2014.) 
Van Cleve, James. “Berkeley, Reid, and Sinha on Molyneux’s Question.” In Sensory Integration 
and the Unity of Consciousness. Edited by David Bennett and Christopher Hill, 193–208. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014. [ISBN: 9780262027786] 
Compares Berkeley’s negative answer and Reid’s positive answer to Molyneux’s question with 
the empirically based negative answer given by Sinha, et al. 2014, raising some issues 
concerning the significance of the latter. 
Other Crossmodal Phenomena 
Other topics of philosophical interest involving multiple sensory modalities include the nature of 
spatial representation across the senses (Eilan, et al. 1993). See also *Molyneux’s Question*, 
Matthen 2017 (cited under *Multisensory Perception*), crossmodal cuing and attention (Clark 
2011), active perception and sensory exploration (Gibson 1988), correspondences between 
stimuli presented to different sensory modalities (Spence 2011 and Parise, et al. 2016), and 
crossmodal imagery (Spence and Deroy 2013). For multisensory integration and processing, see 
 *Multisensory Perception*. For comparisons between different sensory modalities, see 
*Contrasting the Senses*. 
Clark, Austen. “Cross-Modal Cuing and Selective Attention.” In The Senses: Classic and 
Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Edited by Fiona Macpherson, 375–396. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. [ISBN: 9780195385960] 
Examines the implications of a series of experiments by Charles Spence and John Driver, in 
which a cue presented at a location enhances subsequent discriminations at that location, for 
the representation of spatial location. Clark argues that the results of these experiments favor 
the representation of space in a way that is non-modality specific by “variables that range over 
locations . . . independently of what objects are found at those locations” (p. 394). 
Eilan, Naomi, Rosaleen McCarthy, and Bill Brewer. Spatial Representation. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993. [ISBN: 9780631183556] 
A stimulating interdisciplinary collection of essays on the representation of space both within 
and across sensory modalities, for action, and in the ventral (“what”) and dorsal (“where”) 
streams of the visual system, first proposed by Ungerleider and Mishkin, and popularized by 
Milner and Goodale in their work on blindsight (for further information, see Twedt and Proffitt 
2015, cited under *Anthologies: Psychology and Neuroscience*). 
Gibson, Eleanor J. “Exploratory Behavior in the Development of Perceiving, Acting, and the 
Acquiring of Knowledge.” Annual Review of Psychology 39 (1988): 1–42. 
Provides a psychological account of perceptual exploration, in particular, the relation between 
sensory perception, action, and knowledge-acquisition in early childhood. Gibson focuses on 
the perception of affordances, first proposed by Gibson 1966 (cited under *Anthologies and 
Reference: Psychology and Neuroscience*), and the way in which the senses interact to create 
an embodied perspective on the world. For further discussion of exploratory touch, see 
Lederman and Klatzky 2009, cited under *Sensory Modalities: Touch*. 
Parise, Cesare V., Charles Spence, and Ophelia Deroy, eds. Special Issue on Crossmodal 
Correspondences. Multisensory Research 29 (2016). 
Special issue containing recent scientific research on crossmodal correspondences across a 
wide variety of modalities. For a detailed review of the empirical literature, see Spence 2011. 
Spence, Charles. “Crossmodal Correspondences: A Tutorial Review.” Attention, Perception and 
Psychophysics 73 (2011): 971–995. 
A comprehensive review of the empirical literature on crossmodal matching and 
correspondences, ranging from Wolfgang Köhler’s early work on the “Bouba–Kiki” effect to 
Spence’s research on multisensory integration and perception. Also contains an extensive 
bibliography. For recent developments, see Spence and Deroy 2013. 
Spence, Charles, and Ophelia Deroy. “Crossmodal Mental Imagery.” In Multisensory Imagery. 
Edited by Simon Lacey and Rebecca Lawson, 157–183. New York: Springer, 2013. [ISBN: 
9781461458784] 
Examines a variety of philosophical issues concerning crossmodal mental imagery in which the 
presentation of stimuli in one sensory modality results in the formation of imagery in a 
different modality. The authors mark a distinction between “crossmodal” and “multimodal” 
imagery, in which the latter involves a single object represented as possessing properties from 
multiple modalities (cf. Spence and Bayne 2015, cited under *Multisensory Perception*). 
 CONTRASTING THE SENSES 
The articles cited in this section focus on comparisons and differences between sensory 
modalities that a comprehensive theory of sensory perception would need to accommodate. 
Martin 1992 casts doubt on whether such a unified theory is possible, whereas Chirimuuta and 
Paterson 2015 argues that all of the senses may be encompassed by a unified conceptual 
framework. Structural asymmetries between modalities might concern the way in which they 
present space (Martin 1992), the role of external objects (Smith 2011), and their agential features 
(Richardson 2015). Myin, et al. 2015 considers the relation between the structural features of a 
range of actual and possible sensory modalities and their phenomenal or subjective character. 
The temporal character of a variety of sensory modalities is also discussed by Richardson 2014, 
cited under *Crossmodal Phenomena: Molyneux’s Question*. 
Chirimuuta, Mazviita, and Mark Paterson. “A Methodological Molyneux Question: Sensory 
Substitution, Plasticity, and the Unification of Perceptual Theory.” In Perception and Its 
Modalities. Edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, 410–431. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
Poses a methodological Molyneux question concerning whether a single conceptual framework 
can be extended to include all of the senses. On the basis of empirical evidence from sensory 
substitution, neuroplasticity, and Braille reading, the authors argue that, contrary to the 
skepticism of Martin 1992, a positive answer to this question may be possible. 
Martin, Michael. “Sight and Touch.” In The Contents of Experience. Edited by Tim Crane, 196–
215. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. [ISBN: 9780521417273] 
Contrasts the experience of space—empty space, in particular—between visual and tactile 
modalities (see also Richardson 2010, cited under *Sensory Modalities: Vision*, and Young 
2017, cited under *Sensory Modalities: Audition*). Martin argues that asymmetries between 
the phenomenology of vision and touch place pressure on the idea that a single theory of 
perception can account for the rich variety of ways in which humans experience the world (for 
a reply, see Chirimuuta and Paterson 2015). 
Myin, Erik, and Ed Cooke, and Karim Zahidi. “Morphing Senses.” In Perception and Its 
Modalities. Edited by Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Stephen Biggs, 393–409. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. [ISBN: 9780199832811] 
Drawing on the hypothetical example of “smelling color,” along with various cases of sensory 
substitution, the authors evaluate which combinations of answers to the following questions are 
defensible: (1) whether adding features of a source sensory modality to a different target 
modality would alter the phenomenal character of that target modality, and (2) whether the 
phenomenal character of a given modality is dependent solely on structural features of that 
modality. 
Richardson, Louise. “Perceptual Activity and Bodily Awareness.” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 115.2 (2015): 147–165. 
Argues that ordinary sense-perception and various forms of bodily awareness differ in their 
agential features due to the nature of “perceptual monitoring” across different modalities. 
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